Abstract-Aggregation of local sensor observations is a widely used and powerful approach to estimating the global state of large networked systems. However, guaranteeing the integrity of the aggregate remains an open problem, in particular for dynamic networked systems. We consider this problem in a single aggregator model -a system of several networked sensors and one inherently trusted collector -and propose a simple, yet effective, system design for ensuring integrity, supported by a proof-of-concept prototype.
I. INTRODUCTION
Informed decision making based on quantifiable information is contingent on accurate and trustworthy measurements. We focus on networked measurement systems, in which sensors propagate local observations to a single collector in order to produce an aggregate -an approximate global view of the system [1] . We define such systems broadly, encompassing diverse paradigms, such as wireless sensor networks [2] , largescale network monitoring systems [3] and industrial control systems. Our focus is on the integrity of the aggregation process in networked measurement systems in the presence of corrupt sensors, controlled by an insider adversary, whose goal is to stealthily [4] influence the global aggregate computed.
The integrity of the entire aggregation process must be considered in the context of the consuming application and its operators. Our opinion is that the only applications which can tolerate arbitrary inputs, and thus arbitrary aggregates, are trivial ones suitable only for the most basic of tasks. Critical aggregation examples include military applications of sensor networks [5] , [6] , public safety command and control [7] and nuclear plant monitoring [8] . We can also consider applications where money is at stake, such as accurate metering for utilities.
We pose the following question: can the aggregation process be secured in the general case of arbitrary data types and aggregation functions and in dynamic networks, while at the same time giving sufficiently strong integrity guarantees? In our opinion, such level of security is infeasible unless one assumes some means of establishing a basis of trust at the sensor itself: we need some sort of integrity guarantees up front at the time the data is produced in order to ensure integrity of the overall aggregation process. We propose to establish integrity guarantees by applying the principles of trusted systems [9] to construct a trusted sensor -a verifiably correct, tamperproof smart sensor [10] , which provides authenticated results to authorized recipients. We restrict our current work to a single aggregator model in which a number of networked sensors contribute data to a single inherently trusted collector. This model is conceptually simple, yet widely applicable, for instance in centralized network monitoring (e.g. SNMP polling), cloud-based sensing services (e.g. Pachube 1 ) and the relatively new paradigm of shared sensing via mobile devices [11] .
In this paper, we discuss the problem of integrity preserving aggregation in the single aggregator framework and describe the design and prototyping of a system called TSense, which incorporates trusted smart sensors in a centralized client/server model with secure aggregation and authentication servers. The security guarantees are based on the concept of embedding the security mechanisms at the earliest possible point in the sensor chain: at the sensor "head" itself. This allows us to construct a secure measurement network of general-purpose networked observation platforms, e.g. wireless sensor nodes, routers or commodity PCs in a collaborative sensing system.
II. THE CHALLENGES OF SECURE AGGREGATION
A solution which perfectly preserves integrity must fulfill two distinct properties -those of completeness and correctness [12] . We will show (informally) that our solution meets the correctness criterion: if an observation platform contributes an update, then that information will be a verifiably correct reading of the sensor. Ensuring completeness is more problematic, since node churn and failures are a fact of life in a dynamic system and generate considerable uncertainty [13] . An asynchronous system with non-zero delays also introduces errors stemming from to differing sampling times. Both of these factors are outside of the scope of this work, but we remark that a reliability layer can mitigate the effects of naturally occurring network packet loss.
Node compromise is an actual threat in all networked systems, including networked measurement systems. Historically, nodes in wireless sensor networks have been considered inherently vulnerable due to their low cost [14] and most other platforms have a long list of vulnerabilities that compromise their security 2 . In contrast, industrial control systems have been considered relatively immune to corruption owing to their relatively obscure systems and specialized, proprietary networks. However, these assumptions are challenged by the recent Stuxnet worm [15] which specifically targeted industrial control systems, as well as the trend towards integrating industrial and business networks [16] .
III. SYSTEM MODEL Network model. We consider an asynchronous network of observation nodes S ∈ S, each hosting a trusted sensor s which communicate with a single collector and aggregator C. The sensors observe some local phenomenon, such as temperature, pollution particle count or CPU load. Periodically, they transmit a digest of the observations to the collector over an end-to-end secure channel C si,C : s i ⇔ C = s i ↔ S i ↔ C, which has been established pairwise between trusted sensors and the collector over an arbitrary underlying communications graph. The actual communications path between any observation platform S i and C may involve multiple hops, possibly even involving other observation nodes, but the actions of the intermediary nodes are strictly limited to routing.
Aggregation model. The collector C receives a set of observations m t from some subset of observers S t ⊆ S over some period of time [t, t + τ ). An aggregate y(t) = f (m t ) is computed over the contributions. A simple example is the SUM aggregation function: for contributions
We emphasize that our work is not restricted to scalar data types or aggregation functions. Rather, we consider any computable function.
Adversarial model. We assume Wagner's [17] single trusted aggregator model. Observation nodes are vulnerable systems, such as unhardened sensor nodes or general-purpose computing platforms, and thus inherently untrusted. In contrast, the trusted sensors are considered incorruptible by virtue of physical and cryptographic protection. The collector is considered inherently trusted with respect to the integrity of its actions as it is the end consumer of the information produced; any malfeasance runs contrary to its objectives.
A stealthy internal adversary [4] can corrupt any number of observation nodes, but not the collector. The objective of the adversary is to bias the computed aggregate by manipulating the output of the sensors under her control, but to do so over an extended period of time without significantly risking detection.
Outsider attacks are mitigated by the assumption of endto-end secure channels between trusted parties -sensors and the collector. Note that the assumption of pairwise, or hopby-hop, secure relations [18] , [19] between observation nodes is sufficient to prevent outsider manipulation. However, hopby-hop security is ineffective against the insider adversary which we are considering. The end-to-end secure channel C si,C establishes a secure network layer superimposed on the communications overlay which in effect treats the inherently untrusted hosts as outsiders. This removes the capability of the observation nodes to interfere with the value of the updates.
These nodes can, however, drop legitimate updates in their entirety.
We restrict our work to the security objective of data integrity and disregard other important objectives such privacy. Data confidentiality is not an explicit goal of this work but may nevertheless be included at a small added cost in terms of processing and message size. We do not consider availability attacks, such as routing and DoS attacks, because they run counter to the goals of the stealthy adversary as defined above. We further ignore process-of-measurement (PoM) attacks [20] - [22] in which the sensing process itself is attacked; we restrict our attention to network or host-based attacks on the measurement process in the communications path from sensor transducers to the collector and view measures to counter PoM attacks as complementary to the goals of this work.
IV. TSENSE SYSTEM DESIGN Consider a networked measurement system as shown in Figure 1 . A trusted central collector receives updates from a number of observation nodes, which are unhardened platforms, such as general-purpose laptops, hand-held devices, wireless sensor nodes or PLCs. Observation nodes can thus literally be in the hands of the adversary and hence corrupted in various ways.
Each observation node hosts one or more trusted sensors, which establish secure channels to the collector, thereby reducing the potential for the untrusted host and outsider attackers to to influence the aggregation process. This system can be extended to a distributed collector architecture by creating a trusted subnet to the right of the boundary of trust in Figure 1 .
The trusted sensor is a tamper-resistant device whose instruction set and interface is small enough to be formally specified and verified. The integrity of the sensor data is ensured by an in-line cryptographic processor, as shown in Figure 2 (a), akin to a reference monitor in the trusted systems literature [9] . Hence, we can consider the use of a trusted sensor as an extension of the trusted computing base (TCB) of the hosting node to encompass the security critical functions of the sensing and aggregation process. The trusted sensor operates in a close symbiotic relationship with its otherwise untrusted hosting node. Specifically, it has only a rudimentary serial interface, as shown in Figure 2 (b), which exposes a welldefined set of functions. The trusted interface is used by an untrusted application agent on the observation node which may be arbitrarily influenced or even modified by an adversary. The main security goal of the TSense system is to neutralize such misbehavior and guarantee that any update produced by an observation node is a truthful representation of the local state as observed by a trusted sensor.
A natural question is whether the assumption of a local untrusted agent and untrusted observation node is necessary. The short answer is no: an observation node may perhaps be verified as a complete system and hardened to be sufficiently invulnerable to adversarial tampering. However, this is a nontrivial undertaking for any but the smallest of systems. We thus argue for securing only basic, rudimentary functionality in keeping with the spirit of trusted systems theory.
Identity and authentication. Each trusted sensor is uniquely identified by a tuple consisting of a public ID and a secret cryptographic key, both assigned at time of construction by the manufacturer. Our prototype uses a symmetric secret key K As , shared pairwise between sensors and the trusted third party -the authentication server in Figure 1 . The manufacturer is assumed to be trusted for the purposes of this work; we do not consider the untrusted manufacturer problem [23] . The sensor enclosure and interface must be designed in such a manner as to make extraction of the secret key infeasible. However, in the case of a sensor breach, a unique per-sensor identity ensures graceful security degradation rather than a complete system collapse.
Protocols. The cryptographic protocols are the glue that holds the system together. Trusted sensors provide the basis for trust, but secure authentication and transport protocols are required to establish the virtual secure channels between the observation nodes and the trusted collector. We will describe the protocols further in Section V, but let us begin by outlining the issues involved. First of all, we require an authentication protocol, allowing a sensor to be identified as a member of the trusted group. This is accomplished by the trusted sensor identity and the assistance of the trusted third party: only sensors which can match the secret K As held by the authentication service for the identity s can be considered members of the group of trusted sensors.
The authentication process establishes a shared secret between the sensor and the collector, that is, a session key K Cs . The session key is in turn used to establish and periodically refresh a transport key K T .
The third protocol is a transport protocol, which applies fast symmetric authenticating encryption with the transport key pair K T to secure the integrity as well as privacy of the transmitted data against active and passive attackers. Note that in all cases, we assume K to be a key pair, consisting of a key for encryption and an independent one for authentication, in keeping with the key separation principle [24] .
V. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented a complete proof-of-concept TSense system 3 [25] . The trusted sensor, tsensor, shown in Figure 3 , is a USB dongle with temperature and luminosity sensors, powered by the USB bus. We base our implementation on a popular embedded systems processor, the Atmel ATmega328 [26] . For ease of prototyping, we used the Arduino Duemilanovae 4 experimentation board as our development platform. The collector and authenticator are implemented as daemons running on Ubuntu Linux servers.
Implementation. All code is written in C++, including the cryptographic protocols, AES-128 [27] in CBC mode [28] for encryption and AES-CMAC [29] for tagging (MAC). The prototype applies authenticating encryption to all communications, although tagging can be considered sufficient to ensure data integrity. However, the encryption provides an added layer of difficulty for the adversary which we will discuss later.
The tsensor prototype is written in about 1400 lines of code (SLOC) in a C++ variant developed for the Arduino platform; the cryptographic library, which is shared between the tsensor and server platforms, accounts for estimated 880 SLOC thereof. The compiled tsensor binary is 14.5KB and the executing code uses approximately 900 bytes of RAM, including measurement and processing buffers. A newer version of the cryptographic code for the Arduino platform has recently been launched as an independent open-source project 5 . We measured the throughput of the tsensor in our test environment to be 18.9KB/sec for encryption and 9.3KB/sec for decryption. To illustrate the limitations of the sensor hardware, the same cryptographic code executing on our Linux servers achieved a throughput of 4.3MB/sec for encryption. Nevertheless, this performance is sufficient for the task at hand, given a reasonable sensor update frequency. We defer
AUTH, s, IV, ET As (N s , K Cs ) Protocol 1: Authentication protocol (sketch). Sensor s and its untrusted host S communicate with collector C and authentication service A. ET K denotes authenticating encryption using a shared key pair K. N x is a freshly generated nonce. Communication between C and A is protected by a TLS tunnel and encryption is implicit. K As is the pairwise pre-shared key between A and s. IV is an initialization vector required for the CBC-mode of encryption.
NEWKEY, s, IV, ET Cs (s, N s , R) Protocol 2: Transport key establishment and refreshing protocol (sketch). Sensor s requests a transport key, using the session key K Cs established during authentication. C returns key material R -a random number. Both nodes execute a key derivation function K T = KDF(R) to establish shared transport keys. measurements of power consumption and CPU cycles per operation to future work.
Protocols. The authentication protocol is a variant of the Needham-Schroeder symmetric trusted third party protocol [30] . A sketch is shown in Protocol 1. The untrusted agent on the measurement platform bootstraps the process by querying the sensor for its ID. The sensor responds by transmitting its public ID and an encrypted packet exclusively readable by the authentication service (the trusted third party). At this point, a corrupt observation node has only two choices: to drop the packet in which case it has no further influence on the aggregation process, or to follow the protocol and transmit the packet to the collector. The collector forwards the unmodified packet to the authentication service, which returns a fresh session key (separately encrypted) to collector and sensor.
Note that the collector does not hold or learn the secret keys of the sensors during this exchange; the authentication is strictly between sensors and authentication service. This design choice was made in order to be able to implement a distributed trusted collector architecture while minimizing the distribution of the secret keys. The session key is used exclusively to set up a shared and periodically refreshed transport key between the sensor and collector, as shown in Protocol 2.
The data transfer protocol is shown in Protocol 3. This is a straightforward symmetric authenticating encryption protocol which uses AES in CBC mode for encryption and AES-CMAC for authentication in an encrypt-then-MAC composition [31] . Note that the protocol is shown as strictly best-effort, but can readily be made reliable by assuming an underlying reliable transport layer; our prototype uses TCP/IP.
Protocol 3: Transport protocol (sketch). Sensor s sends encrypted and tagged data to C using the shared transport key pair K T . t is a timestamp of the data vector D.
VI. INFORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
We assume the cryptographic primitives and protocols to be secure (within computational bounds) for the purposes of the following brief analysis. We focus on the two important properties for data integrity, namely completeness and correctness, as specified by Narashima and Tsudik [12] in the context of distributed databases.
Correctness. The correctness of results is guaranteed by (i) the physical protection of the sensor, (ii) device identification and authentication, and (iii) the authenticating encryption applied to the data produced.
The secret keys shared pairwise between sensors and the authentication service guarantee that only sensors which are members of the group of trusted devices will be accepted as such by the collectors. Randomly generated keys per sensor device allow us to claim graceful security degradation even if a subset of sensors are compromised.
The cryptographic tag (MAC) applied to the data guarantees that any manipulation of the data by corrupt nodes, including the observation platform hosting the sensor, will be detected and the corresponding update discarded. This ensures that if an update m t i by a sensor s i is received and verified by the collector C, then m t i is correct. Hence, the aggregate y(t) computed from the individual contributions can be considered correct.
Completeness -the property that all sensor contributions are actually delivered -is more challenging to guarantee, if only for the fact that malfunctions and churn are commonplace in all distributed systems. A corrupt observation node may hence mount drop attacks, transparently dropping inconvenient measurements, thereby influencing the aggregate result [13] . However, this is a much less powerful attack than the data modification (correctness) attack considered by Wagner [17] , in which a single corrupt node may arbitrarily influence the aggregate.
The effectiveness of the drop attack is reduced by the symmetric encryption, which guarantees that no unauthorized party, including the observation node hosting the sensor, can observe its readings. Consequently, a corrupt node cannot mount drop attacks on the basis of the observed sensor readings: a malicious node must drop packets blindly, thereby reducing the potential effectiveness of the attack.
Physical security. We do not address physical security in the prototype, as can readily be seen from Figure 3 . The nontrivial issues regarding tamper-resistance [32] , [33] as well as active and passive probing of the device interface [34] are reserved for future work.
Properly designed tamper-proofing should be sufficiently strong to impede the attacker in breaching the sensor device.
Further, the device should be rendered inoperable by the tampering. If these assumptions hold, we can claim graceful degradation of security as discussed previously: each breach requires considerable work on the behalf of the adversary, limiting the practical number of compromised sensors. Further, the internal secrets learned do not help the attacker, as they are unique to the now inoperable device.
VII. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The term resilient aggregation was coined by Wagner [17] , who considers the inherent vulnerabilities of many common scalar aggregation functions in a model in which a single inherently trusted aggregator receives data form several vulnerable sensors, any of which may be compromised. Wagner's results show that many common aggregation functions, such as SUM, MAX and MIN, are inherently vulnerable to even a single corrupt sensor.
Several approaches are suggested by Wagner to increase the resilience of aggregation, including truncation and employing inherently resilient aggregation functions. Truncation -limiting the sensor range to reduce the effects of adversaries -is employed by e.g. Chan et al. [35] , but cannot be considered a good overall solution as it reduces the data fidelity while giving rather weak security guarantees. More resilient aggregation functions, such as the median, have been considered [36] but this approach is limiting in the general case. Probabilistic counting [37] , [38] is another technique that provably increases the resilience of aggregation, although only applicable to a limited selection of aggregation functions. Generalizing further, the previous work in this direction bases its security guarantees on rather simple specialized aggregation function on scalars, a severely restrictive assumption considering future sensing applications, such as sensor fusion [39] - [41] . In contrast, we support the general case of arbitrary data types, aggregation functions, as well as dynamic networks with ever changing node population and link conditions. Integrity preserving aggregation is a widely studied problem for which a number of other models can be constructed. For instance, Chan et al. [4] consider a single aggregator model in which the aggregator may be compromised. A successful attack on an aggregator is clearly devastating, since it allows the adversary to manufacture arbitrary values at will. To counter such an attack, Chan et al. employ interactive proof techniques to limit the number of opportunities for the corrupt aggregator to falsify contributions of individual sensors, yet preserving the economy of aggregation in terms of message complexity.
The single aggregator model can be extended to a hierarchy of aggregators [42] , [43] , in which the aggregate is computed cooperatively in-network, resulting in considerable savings in terms of power, as well as message and time complexity. In this setting, however, the problem of securing the aggregation process becomes even harder and is currently considered to be an open problem, in particular w.r.t. dynamic systems. An approach to securing such hierarchical aggregation networks is presented by Chan et al. [35] , but relies on a static tree topology with fully known node membership. We have previously described an application of trusted systems principles to secure distributed aggregation in dynamic systems [44] .
Trusted devices have been applied in a range of situations: for instance to solve the fair exchange problem [45] , [46] , to provide secure storage primitives [47] and in secure multiparty computation [48] . Trusted sensors have been considered recently by several authors [41] , [49] , [50] . The projects cited all implement trusted sensing in a similar manner to our proposed solution, but with the crucial exception that trust is based on a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). In contrast, we propose to integrate dedicated minimal line-speed security logic in the sensors, rather than using a TPM, since the current generation of TPMs is bloated in terms of functionality and provides slow cryptographic operations [51] . We believe our approach of a dedicated and minimal sensor device is more prudent and in the spirit of the original concepts of trusted systems.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We discussed the problem of trusted sensing in distributed environments with untrusted parties. We proposed a solution based on the principles of trusted systems, consisting of tamper-proof trusted sensor modules, a set of protocols and trusted infrastructure components, which together form a trusted client/server-based measurement network that in turn guarantee (within computational bounds) safe data delivery from the tamper-proof sensor to a trusted collector.
We described an open-source proof-of-concept prototype implementation of our system, based on symmetric cryptographic primitives and a trusted third party authentication service. Our cryptographic code has been tested on both Arduino and Linux platforms and has been released into the public domain as an Arduino library. Although our prototype is limited in several ways, we find it to be a reasonable stepping-stone towards the implementation of a trusted sensor. Possible future work includes construction of a tamper-resistant prototype. Miniaturization may be achieved by using a custom security chip akin to SmartCard or RFID processors, which are currently up to the task in terms of size, cost and processing power. Further developments also include developing of a version based on asymmetric cryptographic primitives that will decrease the reliance on trusted infrastructure services.
